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Abstract 
This  essay  represents  an  attempt  to  highlight,  from  a  philosophical  perspective,  the  most 
significant contradictions that can affect the justice throughout a period of social crisis. The object of 
our analysis consists of the contradictions between: the law and justice; the justice and society and the 
act to fulfill the justice and what we have just called “the fall in exteriority” of justice. Within this 
context we refer to some aspects that characterize the person and personality of the judge.  This essay 
is a pleading to refer to the principles, in the work for the law’s creation and applying. Starting with 
the  difference  between  “given”  and  ‘constructed”  we  propose  the  distinction  between  the 
“metaphysical principles” outside the law, which by their contents have philosophical significances, 
and the “constructed principles” elaborated inside the law. We emphasize the obligation of the law 
maker, but also of the expert to refer to the principles in the work of legislation, interpretation and 
applying  of  the  law.  Arguments  are  brought  for  the  updating,  in  certain  limits,  the  justice  – 
naturalistic concepts in the law.  
Keywords: normative order, law and justice, the contradictions of the justice, the fall 
in exteriority, metaphysical principles and constructed principles  
1. Introduction 
Justice should be a harmonious system in order to be in its truth and reality. “The truth 
is real only as a system”
1 said Hegel and by confirming this statement, justice is in its truth 
only if it satisfies this condition. The system means coherent order, functionality, suitability to 
the real and its purpose, but mainly unity in its diversion, a concrete universal in which each 
part to express the whole and this one to legitimize through the created order, the component 
parts. The system, including the justice one manifests itself dialectically, transforms itself, 
become a historical being, without losing the harmony and coherence. The thinker of Jena 
pointed out that “Truth is the whole. The whole is only the essence that fully accomplishes 
itself  through  its  development”
2.  Like  any  other  system,  justice  has  its  components  or 
subsystems: ideal, value, normative, jurisprudential subsystem (the act of justice), institutional 
and perhaps the most important component, man as a producer, but also as a beneficiary of 
the act of justice. The truth of the judiciary system involves the making in its wholeness but 
also by each component of own existential purpose, which is at the same time its being, 
namely the righteousness as a values ideal but transposed into reality’s concrete.  
To the extent that the functions, we may say, the mission of justice, fulfill and express 
at the same time the functional harmony of a system, which at any time attempts the adequacy 
to its purpose as a value, the fulfilling of justice,  justice finds itself in its truth, otherwise said, 
it gives its own legitimacy without waiting for it to be given, in forms sometimes inadequate, 
from outside.  
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The contradictions and in general any malfunction in the coherence of the system or 
inadequacy to the purpose are maladies, deficiencies of the justice, that departs it from its role 
and truth. When the maladies of the justice become chronical but with manifestations which 
lead towards aggravation, one may speak about a crisis of the system of justice. Our justice is 
obviously in such a chronical crisis with tendencies towards aggravation. The main cause is 
the ailing contradictions of the system. In contrast to the beneficial contradictions that give the 
becoming, the unhealthy ones tend to depart more and more the justice from its reality and 
truth. 
2. Paper Content 
In the followings we try to emphasize the sickly contradictions of the justice system 
specific to the crisis in which this is located:  
1.  The fundamental contradiction of the justice, expression of the profound crisis in which 
this is between law and justice, and on the other side the constructive order of the norms and 
jurisprudence.  The  law,  the  justice  do  not  represent  the  purposes  and  truth  of  justice, 
substituting these values, the law, norms and jurisprudence, that will find legitimacy in  itself, 
in the abstract forms, the ephemeral realities, interests and precarious purposes but not in the 
ideal and reality of justice. Of course even when a judicial system is harmonious functional 
and does not have this malady, there isn’t always a formal overlapping between law and 
justice.  In  the  healthy  justice  system,  between  the  justice  and  law  there  is  a  unilateral 
contradiction in the meaning that the law may contradict the justice, but this one does not 
contradict  the  law.  The  crisis  of  the  judiciary  system  expresses  sometimes  in  aggravated 
forms the inadequacy in absolute terms between the justice and law. 
The above mentioned contradiction unleashed the “will of power” of the governors to 
impose  their  own  order  and  legitimacy  to  justice  by  norming  and  legislating  in  the 
meaningless and illusory attempt to create an “order of the norms” that will replace the being 
and  truth  of  justice:  the  righteousness.  Reality  shows  that  this  false  order  proves  itself 
inconsistent, contradictory and mostly inadequate to the realities it is destined for. The mere 
accumulation of rules, laws even codified, does not lead to the settlement into their being and 
purpose of the man, the “social” and justice if the norms do not express as a phenomenon the 
essence: the superior order of the values of justice, equity, truth, proportionality, tolerance. 
Jurisprudence is manifested the same in the exclusive concern to correspond to itself or to the 
norms, to be sufficient in itself and not be related to the higher order of the values named 
above.  The  act  of  justice  accomplished  by  the  magistrate  obstinately  seeks  for  exclusive 
legitimation only by the rules of law and not through the value order that should be its own.  
This ailing contradiction is confirmed, but not made aware by the judicial technique 
and formalism. A judgement is not pronounced in the name of the justice but in the “name of 
the law”. That is in the name of an order constructed by a temporary political will for the 
fulfilling of some temporary interests steeped into their particularity and often contrary to the 
common good and not, as it should naturally be done, in the name of the order given and not 
constructed of the values outside the justice but which represent its truth and purpose.  
2.  The doctrine asserts that the judge pronouncing a decision “is saying the law”. It would 
be good to be so. In fact, most of times, the magistrate by the judgment pronounced “is saying 
the law” – when he is not doing it – trying to include his sentence in the order of law, which is 
not necessarily the order of justice, the judge if having the conscience of achieving an act of 
justice, respecting his moral and professional statute, does not contradict the law, yet there are 
situations when he should and could do so in the name of a superior order formed out of the 
values subsumed to the justice concept . For such an act, that is not only an act of justice but 
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the constructed imperfect order of the law in order to legitimate the act of justice achieved in 
the superior values reality of the metaphysical principles of law. Such an exiting from the 
normality of the inadequate forms of the concrete reality is risky for the judge, because the 
order  constructed  of  the  law  can  impose  its  coercive  force.  The  contemporary  justice  is 
dominated  by  the  order  of  normativity,  of  forms  that  are  not  abstracted  from  reality  but 
ignores it.  
The sickly rupture between the law and justice (the law as expression of the will of the 
legislator, of the temporary power, the only one seeking such a separation) should be reflected 
in the legal education plan. For a correct suitability to the crisis of justice emphasized by this 
contradiction, but also in order to reflect the order of law and not of righteousness, taught to 
the students, the faculties in speciality shouldn’t be called “Law” Faculties but “Faculties of 
Laws”, as it once was. 
3.  The contradiction between the justice and “world’, throughout “world” we understand 
both the human in his individuality as the society as a whole.  It seems it is increasingly 
present in the actuality of justice and placed in a place of honour the dictum „ Fiat justiţia et 
pereat  mundus.”  It  is  not  a  simple  dictum  but  a  tragic  reality,  a  disease  of  the  justice 
consisting in the inauthentic legitimizing of the separation of justice from the world and man. 
Justice cannot live, triumph, be if the world dies. Bteween justice and the world there is a 
unilateral contradiction: justice can contradict the world, but the world cannot contradict the 
justice, because the world  is  the medium,  the element  that justifies the manifestations  of 
justice. The righteousness through justice involves he man, both as a performer of the act of 
justice and as a beneficiary.   
In its  contemporary manifestations,  the justice in  crisis  is  increasingly making the 
dictum „Fiat justiţia et pereat mundus”, tring to become a closed system, existing for itself 
and in some cases, even worse, directed against human, the only beneficiary of the act of 
justice, denying its own reason for being. The crisis of justice, by this disease, is also found in 
the meaningless rethoric of proclamation of the “abstract man” through rights equally abstract 
with  the  intention  to  give  teleological  form  to  its  manifestations.  But  the  true  existential 
meaning  of justice and  its  finality at  the same  time is  the man considered in  his  human 
dignity. The rhetoric specific to the separation between the justice and world in favour of the 
abstract man, impersonal has obvious manifestations. Before the court, in a judgment, man is 
no longer in the concrete of his dignity as a person, but he becomes the “named” at most 
identified through a locus standing equally impersonal. 
The existential rupture between the justice and world, further more the attempt of 
justice to deny its own medium that justifies its own reason to be, cannot confirm the natural 
dialectical order that should characterize a good placing of justice in its truth, but may have at 
the end of the road the nothingness, justice as an empty form, void of the fullness which only 
the “just” is offering when existing in relation to human’s dignity.  
4.  The  contradiction  between  the  justice  understood  and  even  in  the  acception  of  the 
normative order of law, and on the other side, the act of justice and the magistrate performing 
it. In philosophy one speaks about an autonomous world of the values existing per se and for 
itself independent even to man. As stated, justice is undeniable a reality and a normative 
institutional system but also a system of values. Unlike other systems of moral, religious 
values and in general cultural ones, the essence of justice consists also in its achieving and 
fulfilling through the act of justice of the magistrate without which the justice system does not 
close. One can speak at most about the autonomy of the right understood as an order of 
values, but not about the autonomy of justice outside the act by which it gets concretized. 
Unlike other systems of values or by other nature, justice is a clear example of a universal 
concrete fulfilled through the act of justice whose expression is firstly the decision of the 
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Therefore the act of justice may confirm or refute the normative order of justice and 
equally as much the right as a system of values. It is a situation similar with the relation 
between the experiment and the scientific theory “the first being able to confirm or refure the 
theory, according to the case. Only that in the sphere of scientific theories an experiment may 
invalidate a theory legitimizing a new, superior order, that will include the old one such as it 
once happened with Einstein’s relativity theory. In contrast, the act of justice, if contrary to 
the normative order or the value order of law is only but a mere judiciary error, willfully, 
unintentionally  or  accidental  of  the  magistrate  which  denies  even  the  justice  itself  and 
implicitly  the  right  abolishing  thus  the  order  of  juridical  and  the  lawful  order  having  as 
finality not  another order but  the disorder, the chaos.  How many judicial errors are now 
known or unknown. 
One needs to emphasize the fact that the act of justice cannot dissociate the person of 
the one performing it from the magistrate. A judgment even anonymized is not anonymous: 
the act of justice contains in itself the person but also the personality of the magistrate. We 
can say that not only the magistrate is the author of the act of justice, but also the act of justice 
“makes” the magistrate. When the judiciary errors become obvious – the cause being the 
abandonment by the magistrate of the moral, social, professional statute, he being at peace 
with the disorder that is specific to the existential non-values – it is customary to say that 
these are isolated cases that do not characterize the justice system and lawful order. This is not 
true. Justice as a system of values needs to be confirmed in its own being, coming to truth by 
each act of justice, by each court judgment. A single judiciary error, a single corrupted or 
immoral magistrate “denies it by sending the judiciary and lawful order into nothingness, into 
non-existence. The contemporary reality still provides too many examples for such situations 
so that you wonder if there’s anything left into the value being of justice. Here is an acute 
manifestation and not only a chronical one of crisis of justice. 
Justice located into its being and truth imposes the magistrate, as a fact of conscience, 
the object of judgment: the deeds of the man and not the man, meaning the phenomenal that is 
specific to the humanity of man. Being aware at the principles of law and implicitly the justice 
as a value specific to an order higher than the normative one, the judge, by fulfilling the act of 
justice, must although to teleologically relate to the concrete man even if he will rule only 
over the deeds (actions and omissions) thereof. Unlike this, in case of a sickly justice, the 
judge imagines that he has the power to judge the man.  
5.  The falling in exteriority. Of course the justice made by man and for man is profane, to 
the “measures of man”, but the sacred values are part of his being. 
Being a component of the human temporary reality, the justice understood in its value 
dimension involves the relationship between transcendent and transcendental to which Kant 
and Heidegger referred to. As a reality of man and society, justice should not be transcendent, 
meaning “beyond” the man and the world and neither beyond his own reason for being. If this 
happens we are in the presence of a sickly manifestation specific to the crisis of justice, firstly 
by its separation from the “world” as mentioned above. Justice must be and remain in its 
transcendental being respectively “on this side” of the existential precariousnesses of this 
world and outside the conflicts and political interests of all kinds, without implications in the 
struggle for power or power games. The transcendental of justice is this one’s being in its 
values dimension, is the right as justice manifested phenomenally through the act of justice.  
The contemporary crisis of justice means falling from the immutability of the own 
existential  and  values  transcendental  into  the  social  and  political  exteriority  with  the 
consequence  of  diminishing  or  even  losing  the  very  being  of  the  “right  as  value”. 
Unfortunately  the  examples  are  too  numerous:  conflicts  and  contradictions  inside  the 
institutional system of justice; transformation of justice into a tool for the political actors or of 
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the whole justice system and of the magistrates; shifting from the publicizing of the acts of 
justice, to the media justice, done by the prime mass media; magistrates’ abandonment of the 
moral and professional statute for the illusory gain conferred by the involvement into the 
precariousnesses, sometimes miseries of the world; arrogarnt and aggressive rhetoric without 
substance by random using, and mainly for the satisfaction of some selfish interests many 
times immoral, in the sacred name of justice and law: “in the name of law”, “in the name of 
the right” which become simple formulas for legitimizing of what is lacking legitimacy. The 
falling into exteriority is a painfull manifestation of the crisis of justice which is sensed not so 
much by the judiciary system itself but mainly by the system’s beneficiaries: the man, people 
and society.  
We discussed about the crisis of justice. There is a justice of the crisis consisting in the 
illusion of the system to exist through the sickly contradictions presented above in a world 
which is not in the realization of the “progress in the conscience of liberty” such as Hegel 
believed, but mainly in a process of abolition, abandonment of the values cultural being and 
its replacing through civilization elements, excessive technicization, in a single word through 
the domination of the forms of civilization over the culture and not vice versa like normal. In 
social  and  political  plan  the  world’s  dissolution  process  is  manifested  through  mass 
democracy and the democratic individualism with the consequence of ignoring the man as 
person and personality, man becoming an individual in a political and economical normative, 
social order in which he does not confirm his self as he has become a mere number taken over 
by the rhetoric of forms and void ideals. 
The crisis of justice cannot have a being as it is outside truth and its purpose like the 
society of crisis to which is trying to adapt itself. There can be no proper relation between the 
justice that is in serious sickly contradictions and a society that is in crisis with the purpose to 
legitimize the existence of a justice of crisis. The justice of crisis can however be a reality but 
devoid of truth, of being, because not all that exists it really is. 
It is spoken, somhow with bewilderment about the lonliness and intransigence of the 
judge.  The  judge,  the  magistrate  in  general,  cannot  be  lonely,  he  cannot  isolate  himself, 
cannot alienate himself. But he can be a secluded one. Living in community he must be in 
communion with the others and at the same time he can take in his being and mainly in his 
conscience as much of the feelings, values, aspirations of others, of course if all these bear the 
mark  of  the  being,  they  are  beneficial  and  not  ailing.  The  common  good,  but  only  as  a 
Christian value, must become the own good. The seclusion, the withdrawal in oneself does 
not imply abandoning the social environment on the contrary it implies its regaining and 
evaluation  by  one’s  own  self:  “is  something  deeper  in  us  than  ourselves”  said  Happy 
Augustin. Only by seclusion in own self, the judge may understand man, he can assimilate 
him, he may understand a few about the world’s self. Seclusion but not loneliness: to be with 
you in deeper own self, but in communion with yours’ another one. 
The judge must relate to the concrete man, not to the abstract one, the latter as Goethe 
understood the sum of all people. He must bring closer to his being Eminescu’s words” “in 
every man a world starts its existence”, discovering and understanding this world in every 
man that comes before the judgment seat. In his solitude the joy of the judge must be that to 
which Kant is referring to:”two things fill the soul with ever newer and growing admiration 
and veneration: the starry sky above me and the moral law inside me”.  
Of course, the judge is looking down the ground or (at the earth), such as Aristotel’s 
hand is pointing to in Rafael’s painting. Only thus can he take the real, the concrete, the 
existing, so that together with Plato, to rise up to the idea. The judge is looking down the earth 
naturally in order to feel, to know not only the rational in the real, but also the real as a 
rational and to be aware of piety’s meanings.”Taller is the man kneeling than standing” – 
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Intransigence  can  not  be  in  the  nature  of  a  judge’s  being,  because  it  implies  the 
impersonal authority, manifested in the name of the law and justice, but in fact without man 
and without justice. Intransigence means being placed in the exclusive plan of the formal 
logic with its categoric distinction between the true and false, between “yes’ and “no”. Yet, 
how many senses, how much richness of meanings life is offering between these extreme 
values to which judicial needs be identified. 
Not the intransigence, but piety, mercy should characterize the judge because only 
thus can he see and understand something of every person’s humanity. Noica said:”one needs 
to have mercy for the insignificant ones to see their meaningness”
3 . The piety of the judge is 
the piety of justice. How well the being and meaning of justice was described on 1919 by the 
great legal expert Matei Cantacuzino, and how far we depart today from the truth of justice to 
immerse ourselves into the unauthentic of the “other justice”, of the crisis: “In a small church 
in Rome I saw the painting with a woman holding the black earth into her hands. She warmly 
embraced it; her expression showed she was a mother, with her eyes turned up to the sky she 
seemed she was trying to pull the light out of the sky’s blue. I was expecting to have written 
underneath:  Charity  or  Justice  or  Philanthropy.  It  was  not.  It  was  Justice!  A  justice 
unblindfolded and understaning all pains, and not the other justice, blind with the sword in 
one hand and holding a scale with the other hand, so little, that it couldn’t contain any of our 
miseries. 
3. Conclusions 
An argument for which the philosophy of law needs to be a reality present not only in 
the theoretical sphere but also in the practical activity for normative acts drafting or justice 
accomplishing, is represented by the existence of the general principles and branches of law, 
some of them being consecrated also in the Constitution. 
The principles of law, by their nature, generality and profoundness, are themes for 
reflection  firstly  for  law’s  philosophy,  only  after  their  construction  in  the  sphere  of  law 
methaphysics,  these  principles  can  be  transposed  to  the  general  theory  of  law,  can  be 
consecrated normatively and applied to jurisprudence. In addition, there is a dialectical circle 
because the “understandings” of the principles of law, after the normative consecration and 
the jurisprudential drafting, are subject to be elucidated also in the sphere of the philosophy of 
law. Such a finding however imposes the distinction between what we may call: constructed 
principles of law and on the other side the metaphysical principles of law.The distinction 
which  we  propose  has  as  philosophical  grounds  the  above  shown  difference  between 
‘constructed” and “given” in the law. 
The constructed principles of law are, by their nature, juridical rules of maximum 
generality, elaborated by the juridical doctrine by the law maker, in all situations consecrated 
explicitly by the norms of law. These principles can establish the internal structure of a group 
of juridical relationships, of a branch or even of the unitary system of law. The following 
features can be identified: 1) are being elaborated inside law, being as a rule, the expression of 
the manifestation of will of the law maker, consecrated in the norms of law; 2) are always 
explicitly expressed by the juridical norms; 3) the work of interpretation and enacting of law 
is  able  to  recognize  the  meanings  and  determinations  of  the  law’s  constructed  principles 
which, obviously, cannot exceed their conceptual limits established by the juridical norm. In 
this  category  we  find  principles  such  as:  publicity  of  the  court’s  hearing,  the  adversarial 
principle, law supremacy and Constitution, the principle of non-retroactivity of law, etc. 
Consequenlty, the law’s constructed principles have, by their nature, first a juridical 
connotation and only in subsidiary, a metaphysical one. Being the result of an elaboration 
inside the law, the eventual significances and metaphysical meanings are to be, after their 
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later consecration, established by the metaphysic of law, at the same time, being norms of 
law,  have  a  mandatory  character  and  produce  juridical  effects  like  any  other  normative 
regulation. Is necessary to mention that the juridical norms which consecrate such principles 
are superior as a juridical force in relation to the usual regulations of law, because they aim, 
usually,  the  social  relations  considered  to  be  essential  first  in  the  observance  of  the 
fundamental rights and of the legitimate interests recognized to the law subjects, but also for 
the stability and the equitable, predictable and transparent carry on of juridical procedures. 
In case of a such category of principles, the above named dialectical circle  has the 
following look: 1) the constructed principles are normatively drafted and consecrated by the 
law maker; 2) their interpretation is done in the work of law’s enacting; 3) the significances of 
values of such principles are later being expressed in the sphere of metaphysics of law; 4) the 
metaphysical  “meanings”  can  establish  the  theoretical  base  necessary  to  broaden  the 
connotation  and denotation  of the principles or normative drafting  of  several  such newer 
principles. 
The  number  of  the  constructed  principles  of  law  can  be  determined  to  a  certain 
moment of the juridical reality, but there is no preconstituted limit for them. For instance, we 
mention the “principle of subsidiarity”, a construction in the European Union law, assumed in 
the legislation of several European states, included in Romania. 
The metaphysical principles of law can be considered as a ‘given” in relation to the 
juridical  reality  and  by  their  nature,  they  are  outside  law.  At  their  origin  they  have  no 
juridical,  normative,  respectively  jurisprudential  elaboration.  They  are  a  transcendental 
‘given” and not a transcendent of the law, consequently, are not “beyond’ the sphere of law, 
but are something else in the juridical system. In other words, they represent the law’s essence 
of values, without which this constructed reality cannot have an ontological dimension. 
Not being constructed, but representing a transcendental, metaphysical “given” of law, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  be  expressed  explicitly  by  the  juridical  norms.  The  metaphysical 
principles may have also an implicit existence, discovered or valued throughout the work for 
law’s interpretation. As implicit “given” and at the same time as transcendental substance of 
law these principles must eventually meet in the end in the contents of any juridical norm and 
in every document or manifestation that represents, as case is, the interpretation or enacting of 
the juridical  norm.  It  should  be emphasized that  the existence of metaphysical principles 
substantiates also the teleological nature of law, because every manifestation in the sphere of 
juridical, in order to be legitimate, must be suited to such principles.  
In  the  juridical  literature,  such  principles,  without  being  called  metaphysical,  are 
identified by their generality and that’s why they were called “general principles of law”. We 
prefer  to  emphasize  their  metaphysical,  value  and  transcendental  dimension,  which  we 
consider metaphysical principles of juridical reality. As a transcendental ‘given” and not a 
constructed  one  of  the  law,  the  principles  in  question  are  permanent,  limited,  but  with 
determinants and meanings that can be diversified within the dialectical circle that contains 
them. 
In our view, the metaphysical principles of law are: principle of fairness; principle of 
truth; principle of equity and justice; principle of proportionality; principle of liberty. In a 
future study, we will explain extensively the considerents that entitle us to identify the above 
named  principles  for  having  a  metaphysical  and  a  transcendental  value  in  respect  to  the 
juridical realities. 
The  metaphysical  dimension  of  such  principles  is  undeniable,  yet  still  remains  to 
argument  the  normative  dimension.  An  elaborate  analysis  of  this  problem  is  outside  the 
objective of this study, which is an extensive expose about the philosophical dimension of the 
pruinciples of law. The contemporary ontology does not consider the reality by referral to 
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(1910)  Ernest  Cassirer  opposes  the  modern  concept  of  function  to  the  ancient  one  of 
substance. Not what is the “thing” or actual reality, but their way of being, their inmost make, 
the structure concern the modern ones. Ahead of knowledge there are no real objects, but only 
“relations”  and  “functions”.  Somehow,  for  the  scientifical  knowledge,  but  not  for  the 
ontology,  the  things  disappear  and  make  space  for  the  relations  and  functions.  Such  an 
approach is operational cognitive for the material reality, not for the ideal reality, that ‘world 
of ideas” which Platon was talking about.
4 
The normative dimension of juridical reality seems to correspond very well to the 
observation made by Ernest Cassirer. What else is the juridical reality if not a set of social 
relations and functions that are transposed in the new ontological dimension of “juridical 
relations” by applying the law norms. The principles constructed applied to a sphere of social 
relations  by  means  of  juridical  norms  transforms  them  into  juridical  relations,  so  these 
principles  correspond  to  a  reality  of  judicial,  understood  as  the  relational  and  functional 
structure. 
There is an order of reality more profound than the relations and functions. Constantin 
Noica said that we have to name an “element” in this order of reality, in which the things are 
accomplished,  which  make  them  be.  Between  the  concept  of  substance  and  the  one  of 
function or relation a new concept is being imposed, that will maintain the substantiality 
without being dissolved in functioning, to manifest the functionality
5.  
Assuming the great Romanian philosopher idea, one can assert that the metaphysical 
principles  of  law  evoke  not  only  the  juridical  relationships  or  functions,  but  the  “valoric 
elements” of juridical reality, without which it would not exist. 
The metaphysical  principles of law have a normative value,  even if not  explicitly 
expressed by law norms. Furthermore, such as results from jurisprudence interpretations, they 
can  even  have  a  supernormative  significance  and  thus,  can  legitimate  the  justnaturalist 
conceptions in law. These conceptions and the superjuridicality doctrine asserted by Francaise 
Geny, Leon Duguit and Maurice Duverger, consider that justice, the constitutional justice, in 
particular, must relate to rules and superconstitutional principles. In our view, such standards 
are  expressed  precisely  by  the  metaphysical  principles  which  we  referred  to.  The 
juristprudential conceptions were applied by some constitutional courts. It is famous on this 
meaning, the decision on January 16
th 1957 of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
with regard to the liberty to leave the federal territory. The Court declares: “The laws are not 
constitutional unless they were not enacted with the observance of the norms foreseen Their 
substance must be in agreement with the supreme values established by the Consitution, but 
they need to be in conformity with the unwritten elementary principles (s.n.) and with the 
fundamental principles of the fundamental Law, mainly with the principles of lawfull state 
and the social state”
6. 
One last thing we wish to emphasize refers to the role of the judge in applying the 
principles constructed especially the metaphysical principles of law. We consider that the 
fundamental rule is that of interpretation and implicitly of enacting any juridical regulation 
within  the  spirit  and  with  the  observance  of  the  valoric  contents  of  the  constructed  and 
metaphysical  principles  of  law.  Another  rule  refers  to  the  situation  in  which  there  is  an 
inconsistency between the common juridical regulations and on the other side the constructed 
principles and the metaphysical ones of the law. In such a situation we consider, in the light of 
the jurisprudence of the German constitutional court, that the metaphysical principles need to 
be applied with priority, even at the expense of a concrete norm. In this manner, the judge 
                                                 
4  For  more  details  see  also,  Constantin  Noica,  Devenirea  întru  fiinţă,  [Becoming  into  Being],  Bucharest:  Humanitas 
Publishing House, 1998, p. 332-334. 
5 Constantin Noica, quoted works. p. 327-367. 
6 For details see Andreescu  Marius , quoted works,  p. 34-38. Marius ANDREESCU  235 
 
respects the character of being of the juridical system, not only the functions or juridical 
relations.  
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